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  Macroeconomics

  Economists concluded from the Great Depression that a price system could function without ensuring full employment. This conclusion led to the rise of macroeconomics, the study of the factors leading to the overall level of prices and employment.

  With his 1936 book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, John Maynard Keynes established himself as the First macroeconomist. His book resulted in Keynesian economics, of which the American economist Paul Samuelson was doyen. Keynesian macroeconomists concluded that employment and the price level depend on the level of total spending. If consumers saved more than investors invested, the result would be a leakage from the spending stream and a shortage of aggregate demand (the total demand for resources from consumption and investment). The shortfall in spending would cause a decline in employment and prices.

  On the other hand, if there were an excess of spending, the demand on resources would drive up prices and the economy would experience inflation.

  Macroeconomists concluded that the way to manage the economy was for the government to manage demand. If there was insufficient spending to maintain full employment, the government would fill in the gap by running a deficit in its budget. That is, the government would spend more than it received in tax revenues, thus adding to aggregate demand (consumption + investment + government).

  If there was too much spending, the government would reduce the amount by running a budget surplus. In other words, the government would collect more in tax revenues than it would spend, thus contracting the spending stream.

  The Keynesians grasped the importance of aggregate demand, but the only economist (a physical chemist actually) who got it right was Michael Polanyi in his 1945 book, Full Employment and Free Trade (Cambridge University Press). Polanyi anticipated Milton Friedman and the American monetarists. Polanyi interpreted Keynes’ theory to mean that widespread unemployment meant that there was a dearth of money. What the government needed to do was to expand the monetary circulation. It could do this, Polanyi noted, simply by printing money to finance its deficit.

  Polanyi made more important deductions than the Keynesians. He said that it was expensive for the government to borrow money, on which it had to pay interest, in order to cover its deficit and that this expense was pointless. Government could more cheaply provide the missing purchasing power by printing the money to cover its budget deficit. In other words, Polanyi understood Keynes to mean that fiscal policy is a way to expand the money supply when reluctance or impaired ability to borrow and lend prevented the central bank from expanding the supply of money.

  In 1945, Polanyi’s conclusions were too advanced for the economics profession. But two decades later, in the 1960s, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz made it clear that the Great Depression in the U.S. during the 1930s was caused by Federal Reserve mistakes that resulted in one-third shrinkage in the supply of money. The depression in the UK following World War I resulted from the decision by the British government to go back on the gold standard at the prewar parity of the British pound sterling and gold. As the British money supply had expanded so much, the return to gold at prewar parity required shrinkage in the money supply, a shrinkage that collapsed employment and prices in the UK.

  Thus, the Keynesians, who had the right idea, initially did not understand that full employment is a monetary phenomenon. If government spends more by borrowing to finance its deficit, its borrowing reduces spending on consumption and investment in the same way as taxation does. A budget deficit can boost consumer demand only if the central bank accommodates the deficit by expanding the money supply.

  The Keynesians’ second mistake came from their failure to understand the impact of fiscal policy on supply. To maintain full employment, the Keynesians came to rely on monetary expansion. Keynesian demand management kept money and credit abundant to ensure sufficient spending. To restrain inflation, Keynesians relied on high tax rates to withdraw spending power from the population that the easy monetary policy provided. The Keynesian economists believed that high taxes served to reduce consumer demand to noninflationary levels. In fact, high tax rates reduced the supply of labor and the supply of goods and services, while easy money pushed up consumer demand. Consequently, prices rose.

  The Keynesian demand management policy came unglued and failed during the Carter administration in the late 1970s. Worsening trade-offs between inflation and unemployment left macroeconomists with no policy solution except wage and price controls. In other words, the failure of macroeconomics meant that the price system would not be allowed to allocate resources. Unable to remedy the cause of inflation, Keynesians proposed using government coercion to prevent wages and prices from rising.

  Congress was unhappy with this proposal. Congress had recently had an experience with fixing one price – the price of oil – and it had been a disaster. Congress was in no mood to fix all prices. Congress preferred to listen to new voices, the voices of “supply-side economists” (in contrast to Keynesian “demand-side economists”). Supply-side economists were new macroeconomists who had a policy with both blades of the scissors. They pointed out that, in Keynesian macroeconomics, fiscal policy (changes in tax rates or changes in government spending) only affects aggregate demand: higher taxes reduce consumer purchasing power and aggregate demand declines; lower taxes increase consumer purchasing power and aggregate demand rises. Supply-side economists said that, in fact, changes in marginal tax rates (the rate of tax on additions to income) change aggregate supply.

  Supply-side economics is a correction to Keynesian demand management. It has nothing to do with “trickle-down economics” or with a claim that tax cuts pay for themselves. Supply-side economics says that some fiscal policies shift the aggregate supply curve, not the aggregate demand curve. Specifically, if marginal tax rates are raised, aggregate supply will decline. There will be fewer goods and services supplied at every price. If marginal tax rates are lowered, aggregate supply will increase; there will be more goods and services available at every price.

  Today, this conclusion is no longer controversial, but in the 1970s it was a new thought. Initially, Keynesians resisted it, but Paul Samuelson came to terms with supply-side economics in the twelfth edition of his economics textbook and accepted in principle the relative price effects of fiscal policy.

  By bringing relative prices that affect individual behavior into macroeconomics, supply-side economists integrated microeconomics with macroeconomics, a long-standing goal that economics had not achieved. Supply-side economists showed that a shift in marginal tax rates changes relative prices and affects individual decisions whether to save more or to consume more, and whether to work more or to enjoy more leisure. The allocation of income between saving (investment) and consumption and the allocation of time between work and leisure affect the growth rate of the economy. (See Paul Craig Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution, Harvard University Press, 1984.)

  Think about it this way. The cost of current consumption is the foregone future income from saving and investment. Income is an after-tax phenomenon. The higher the tax rate on income, the less current consumption costs in terms of foregone future income or, in other words, the less future income is given up by today’s consumption. The lower the tax rate, the larger the amount of future income that is lost by consuming instead of investing.

  For example, consider the 98 percent tax rate on investment income that was the rule in England prior to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Suppose a person has 100,000 pounds. Shall he invest it or purchase a Rolls Royce? If he invests the money at, say, 10 percent, he would earn 10,000 pounds before tax. But after-tax, his earnings would be reduced to 200 pounds. Thus, the opportunity cost of the Rolls Royce is only 200 pounds a year in foregone income. The high tax rate on investment income makes current consumption extremely inexpensive in terms of foregone income.

  If the tax rate on investment income is 15 percent, the cost of the Rolls Royce in terms of foregone income would
be 8,500 pounds per year, or 42.5 times as much annually. The 98 percent tax rate on investment income makes the Rolls Royce essentially a free good. The 15 percent tax rate makes the car purchase expensive.

  Similarly, the cost of leisure is the income given up by not working. The higher the tax rate, the less the after-tax income lost by using time for leisure instead of work. The lower the tax rate, the more expensive is leisure in terms of foregone income. The marginal tax rate on earned income thus affects the supply of labor.

  Supply-side economics also corrected a mistake in capital theory. Economists taught that the interest rate determines the cost of capital. If the interest rate is high, capital is costly and investment small. If the interest rate is low, capital is cheap and investment flourishes. At one time this theory made sense, and that time was prior to the income tax. Capital theory originated prior to the income tax, and until supply-side economists came along, no adjustment had been made for the impact of taxation on the cost of capital. When there is an income tax, profits or the earnings of capital are an after-tax phenomenon. The higher the tax rates, the higher the cost of capital, and the lower is investment and the growth of the economy. (See Paul Craig Roberts, Aldona Robbins, and Gary Robbins, “The Relative Impact of Taxation and Interest Rates on the Cost of Capital,” in Technology and Economic Policy, edited by Ralph Landau and Dale Jorgenson, 1986.)

  Supply-side economists added supply to the macroeconomic scissors. Prior to supply-side economics in the 1970s, macroeconomics was stuck in the pre-Marshallian past. The stagflation that destroyed Jimmy Carter’s presidency was induced by policy. Demand-side Keynesians pumped up consumer demand with easy money, while they restrained output with high tax rates. The result was stagflation.

  People unfamiliar with facts claim that it was Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker’s tight monetary policy that cured stagflation. This erroneous claim ignores that prior to the Reagan administration’s supply-side policy, tight monetary policy had had no effect on stagflation. Indeed, all Volcker’s tight money did was to drive interest rates on money market funds to 17 per cent, thus providing plenty of consumer spending power to drive inflation higher while high tax rates suppressed investment. A person with $100,000 in savings in a money market fund was receiving $17,000 a year in pre-tax income.

  Today, Keynesian economics has been reconciled with monetarism and with supply-side economics, making macroeconomics a coherent whole.

  However, today macroeconomic policy faces new challenges. In the 21st century, the U.S. economy has been kept going by an expansion in consumer debt, not by rises in consumers’ real incomes. Burdened with large credit card and mortgage debt, consumers are no longer in a position to borrow more in order to spend more. Interest rates are very low, and the government’s budget deficit is very large; yet, high unemployment persists.

  Monetary and fiscal policy cannot help when the problem is that American jobs have been relocated offshore. Because of offshore production, stimulating demand stimulates production in China and other offshore sites. As high-productivity jobs have been offshored, American incomes, except for the super-rich, have ceased to grow. Thus, there is no effective way to boost consumer spending short of printing money and giving it to the population, or handing out tax rebates accommodated by monetary expansion.

  Prior to the collapse of world socialism and the rise of the high-speed Internet, it was not possible to offshore jobs or production for U.S. markets to any significant extent. In those prior times, American incomes rose with productivity. If a glitch in employment occurred, an expansionary demand-side or supply-side policy would boost employment and GDP. Today, the jobs have been moved abroad. The jobs are not waiting on an expansionary policy to call Americans back to work.

  Trade deficits mean that consumers have spent their money on goods produced abroad at the expense of domestic GDP and employment growth. Writing on the CounterPunch website (Dec. 11, 2008), economist Peter Morici reports that U.S. GDP is $1.5 trillion smaller as a result of the record trade deficits accumulated over the previous 10 years.

  $1.5 trillion is still a large sum. Without this loss in GDP, there would be $5,000 in additional income for each one of the 300,000,000 Americans. A family of four would have $20,000 additional income.

  A country that gives away its productive capability and GDP and becomes dependent on foreign creditors to finance its budget and trade deficits is a country that has problems beyond the reach of monetary and fiscal policies. For example, no country’s borrowing ability is unlimited. The U.S. has been financing its trade and budget deficits by turning over the ownership of existing U.S. assets and their income streams to foreigners and by foreigners recycling their trade surplus dollars into the purchase of new U.S. Treasury debt. This dependence on foreign creditors constrains U.S. monetary and fiscal policy.

  Such creditors hold most of their reserves in dollar-denominated assets. The low interest rates and large budget deficits that are the traditional macroeconomic response to recession make America’s creditors reluctant to add to their dollar holdings. The question has risen whether the U.S. can continue to hemorrhage debt and retain the reserve currency role. If the U.S. dollar is dethroned as reserve currency, the U.S. would no longer be able to pay its bills in its own currency. Such a development would complicate America’s financing needs. The U.S. has become an import-dependent country, dependent on foreigners for energy, manufactured goods, and advanced technology products.

  The U.S. has been able to consume more than it produces and to borrow more than it saves because the dollar is the reserve currency. Other countries that get into such a situation either go broke and lose all access to credit or accept an International Monetary Fund austerity program that forces them to curtail consumption and to pay down debt. For the U.S., an IMF austerity program would mean a substantial reduction in living standards.

  What can be done? As it would be very difficult for the U.S. to get its house in order if it were to lose the reserve currency role, the government should take immediate action to preserve this role. Preserving the dollar as reserve currency requires large reductions in trade and budget deficits, a tall order for the current weak state of the U.S. economy.

  The U.S. could reduce the budget deficit by hundreds of billions of dollars by ending its pointless and illegal wars, by closing hundreds of overseas military bases, and by cutting an overstuffed military budget. This would require the U.S. to give up its goal of world hegemony, but now that America’s creditors have seen its aggressiveness, and this aggressiveness shows signs of turning toward China and Russia, creditors are unlikely to continue financing U.S. militarism. In the absence of foreign financing of U.S. deficits, or of insufficient foreign savings to cover annual U.S. budget deficits in excess of one trillion dollars, the Federal Reserve would have to monetize the U.S. deficit by purchasing the bond issues. Large scale debt monetization can result in high rates of inflation.

  In traditional economic analysis, rising domestic unemployment curtails imports as consumers have less income to spend, thus reducing the trade deficit. The U.S. needs to do much more. U.S. manufacturing has declined so much that, should its creditors permit, the time is not far off when the U.S. trade deficit becomes as large a share of GDP as its manufacturing output.

  Offshored production needs to be brought home. When corporations offshore their production for U.S. markets, they reduce U.S. GDP and increase the trade deficit, dollar for dollar.

  The U.S. could bring home its offshored production by abolishing the corporate income tax and taxing corporations according to whether value is added to their products at home or abroad. Corporations that produce their products in the U.S. would have a low rate of tax; those that offshore their production would have a high rate of tax.

  This change would take time to become effective, and in the near term it could anger creditors, such as China, a country where production for the U.S. market has raised employment and income. However, if the policy of
bringing production home was seen as credible, the world would see a renewed prospect for the U.S. dollar as reserve currency.

  Another helpful reform would be to overthrow performance pay for management based on short-term profits. Quarterly reporting and the cap on executive pay that is not performance based gives U.S. corporate executives a very short-time horizon compared to overseas competitors.

  These suggestions would have to overcome powerful vested interests. Moreover, the hubris of American elites might outlast the window of opportunity that exists for the renewal of the U.S. economy.

  Free Trade Error

  Until recently, economists believed that the case for free trade was unassailable. Most economists still think that the case is secure. However, the two necessary conditions for David Ricardo’s 200-year-old theory are no longer present in the modern world. Moreover, the latest work in trade theory, Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests (MIT Press, 2000), by Ralph E. Gomory and William J. Baumol, shows that the case for free trade was incorrect from the beginning.

  Let’s begin with the original case for free trade. It is based on the principle of comparative advantage. This principle says that it pays for countries to specialize and to trade even if one country can produce all tradable goods at a lower cost than the other country. This conclusion follows from countries having different “opportunity costs” of producing tradable goods. The opportunity cost of any good is the other goods that could have been produced by the same resources.